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THEORIES OF JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
Prof Dr.Ernst-UlrichPetersmann*
I. INTRODUCTION

According to John Rawls, "[j]ustice is the first virtue of social
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought."' This article argues
that constitutional democracy and the universal recognition of human
rights, as well as the need to legally constitute international markets
for mutually beneficial cooperation among citizens across frontiers,
offer a convincing framework for a modern, international theory of
justice. This theory of justice takes into account the globalization of
human rights and the need for non-discriminatory, rules-based
market competition coordinating the global division of labor among
producers, investors, traders, and consumers around the globe.
Theories of justice and theories of human rights 2 often neglect to
recognize that markets are inevitable consequences of the protection
of human rights. In order to create the resources necessary for
enjoying human rights and to coordinate autonomous conduct of free
people, markets need to be legally constituted so as to limit market

* Professor of International and European Law in the European University
Institute and its Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at Florence,
Italy. Former professor at the University of Geneva (Switzerland) and its
Graduate Institute of International Studies, and former legal adviser in the
German Ministry of Economic Affairs, GATT,and the WTO.
1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999).
2. This contribution uses the terms human rights and constitutional rights
interchangeably in view of the "human right to democratic governance," which
includes a right of citizens to define their respective national and international
human rights through constitutional contracts and "constitutional conventions"
like the two European Conventions which, in December 2000, adopted the
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2000 O.J. (C

364) 1 [hereinafter EU CHARTER] and, in July 2003, adopted the DRAFT
TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, July 18, 2003, CONV

850/03 [hereinafter DRAFT TREATY]
CHARTER).

(whose Part H includes the EU
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failures and provide collective public goods. 3 This article describes
the emergence of international constitutional law, not only in the law
of international organizations constituting legislative, executive, and
judicial organs with mutual checks and balances, but also by means
of universal recognition of inalienable human rights, additional
constitutional rights, jus cogens, and erga omnes obligations in
general international law.
The need for, and difficulties of,
"constitutionalizing" foreign policies and international economic
markets, as well as "political markets" (such as for collective public
goods), are discussed in the context of a theory of justice aimed at
protecting human dignity and human rights at home and abroad.
II. JUSTICE AS THE OBJECTIVE OF NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The United Nations (U.N.) Charter, 4 the Treaty establishing the
European Union (EU), 5 the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe, 6 as well as numerous other international treaties and
national constitutions refer to justice as a central objective of
international and national law. International legal theory also
suggests that compliance with international rules (i.e., rule of law)
depends no less on the perceived legitimacy of the international
rules 7 than on governments' cost/benefit analyses8 and on the

3. For a criticism of the neglect of economic individual rights and of the
perception, widespread especially among Anglo-Saxon human rights
specialists, of individuals as mere objects of economic government policies,
see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and
Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 845, 845-51 (2002) [hereinafter Rejoinder to Alston].
4. See U.N. CHARTER art 1.
5. CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5, http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/EU-Consol.pdf [hereinafter EU TREATY].
6. See DRAFT TREATY, supra note 2.
7. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG

NATIONS 24, 49 (1990) (defining legitimacy and identifying the following four
major factors for assessing a rule's legitimacy: its determinacy, symbolic
validation, coherence, and adherence).
8. See LOuIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979) (asserting that, for reasons of cost/benefit analysis,
"almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and

almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.").
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"internalization" 9 of intergovernmental rules into domestic laws and
policy-making processes. These assumptions of legal theory are
consistent with those of political science, according to which
political processes tend to be determined not only by the relative
power and interests of the actors (e.g., by individual and collective
utility maximization), but also by rules, institutions, and ideas (e.g.,
on justice).10
Since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers Plato and
Aristotle, legal philosophy has tended to define justice in terms of
rational principles that justify the constitutional recognition of equal
rights and fair procedures for the distribution of scarce resources."
Between the peace treaties of Westphalia in 1648 up to the end of the
East/West divide in 1989, international legal theories focused on the
sovereignty and consent of states and on the intergovernmental
constitution of an international legal community. 12 The modern
recognition-in numerous worldwide and regional human rights
conventions and other human rights instruments-of "the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family [as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world"'13 requires basing international law, public policy, and
justice on "normative individualism," (i.e., that "all human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.")' 4
Also, in
9. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-46 (1997) (arguing that voluntary obedience due to

internalization is preferable to coercion).

10. See, e.g., IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993).
11. See CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13-26, 191-99 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing the ancient

Greek concept of law as "participation in the idea of justice" and the need to
relate justice not only to the value of equality. See id. at 17.).
12. Cf ALFRED VERDROSS, DIE VERFASSUNG DER VOLKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW
COMMUNITY] (1926); HERMANN MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A

16 (1980) ("Any society, however unorganised it might
be, must have one essential constitutional rule in the absence of which it would
not be a community but simply a collection of individuals. This is the rule
according to which law is created and developed.").
13. UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl.,
LEGAL COMMUNITY

U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. This text has been
subsequently incorporated into most U.N. human rights conventions.
14. Id.
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international economic law, values and policies must be legitimized
through individual consent, equal rights, and democratic procedures
rather than only through utilitarian merchants' philosophies of
maximizing individual and social "utilities" on the basis of the
measuring rod of money
and abstract notions of "welfare" and
"economic efficiency."' 15
The universal recognition, evidenced in national constitutions
(such as in Article 1 of the German Basic Law), EU law (Article 1 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU
Charter)), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (i.e.,
Article 1), and in regional and worldwide human rights conventions,
of inalienable human rights deriving from human dignity can be
understood as requiring the interpretation of national and
international law as a functional unity for promoting individual and
democratic autonomy and diversity. In the modem, globallyintegrated world, more than six billion individuals and some 200
sovereign states compete for scarce goods, services, and capital.
Conflicts of interests are legally and economically inevitable and
ubiquitous. From a human rights perspective, international justice
refers, above all, to human rights and democratic procedures that
justify the allocation and protection of equal basic rights, and the
distribution of scarce resources necessary for personal selfdevelopment of individuals as morally and rationally autonomous
social human beings. The universal recognition, as all major U.N.
human rights conventions and U.N. human rights declarations
evince, 16 of human dignity as the moral source and ultimate objective
15. Cf,e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d ed.

1977) ('Efficiency' means exploiting economic resources in such a way that
'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness
to pay for goods and services-is maximized."). For a criticism of Posner's
theory of "justice as efficiency" and, more generally, of utilitarian theories of
justice, see TOM CAMPBELL, JUSTICE 124-48 (2d ed. 2001); SERGECHRISTOPHE KOLM, MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE

403-72 (1996).

16. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316

(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N.G.A. Res. 2106 (XX),
U.N. GAOR, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1996) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969);
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of inalienable human rights places theories of justice into a new
constitutional context: Respect for, and protection of, human dignity
(in the sense of moral autonomy, rational autonomy, personal and
legal autonomy, equality, and responsibility of individuals) and
inalienable human rights have become part of national and
international constitutional law; as such, they must be the guiding
principle for theories of justice aimed at empowerment of individuals
through protection of equal basic rights, non-discriminatory
competition, satisfaction of basic individual needs, and the
democratic self-government that is necessary for personal selfdevelopment in dignity.
The legal implications of the universal recognition of human
rights for theories of justice and for the interpretation of the U.N.
Charter obligations so far have not been clarified.' 7 In view of the
existence of more than one hundred international treaties and other
human rights instruments re-confirming and legally applying
(through worldwide and regional human rights bodies) an inalienable
core of human rights, 18 there is strong evidence that many of the core
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/index.html; Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 112 (entered into force June 26, 1987); Convention on
the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.
49, art. 37(a), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990)
[hereinafter collectively Human Rights Conventions].
17. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has long since recognized that
U.N. member states also have human rights obligations under the U.N.
Charter. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27). Yet, the expanding scope of these human rights
obligations under the U.N. Charter remains to be clarified.
18. For example, in the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child,
ratified by more than 190 states, the state parties recognized "that the United
Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that
everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein."
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 16, pmbl. See also
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003); THE
FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James
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human rights listed in the UDHR have evolved into "constitutional
obligations" of all U.N. member states and U.N. bodies under the
U.N. Charter. This evolutionary change of U.N. law calls for new
interpretations of some of the traditionally state-centered concepts of
the U.N. Charter, such as focusing not only on state security and
aggression against states in the interpretation of Chapter VII, but also
on human security, democratic peace, and on the human rights
obligations following from U.N. membership. 19
This article
concludes that, contrary to the suggestion by John Rawls to base
international justice on equal freedoms of peoples, 20 human rights
offer a more appropriate constitutional basis for national as well as
international justice.
III. DIVERSITY AND COMMON CORE OF THEORIES OF JUSTICE
AND OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Even though justice is acknowledged as a common objective in
numerous international treaties and national constitutions, the legal
principles and procedures for realizing justice differ from treaty to
treaty and from country to country. As human rights protect
individual and democratic diversity, national and international
human rights instruments also reveal an enormous variety of legal
defmitions, legislative balancing, and national and international
implementation of human rights and corresponding obligations of
national governments and intergovernmental organizations. Legal
theories of justice likewise differ considerably depending on their
underlying worldviews and moral and legal value premises.21 For
instance:
Crawford eds., 2000);
REPORTING,

(1997).

UNITED NATIONS

MANUAL

ON HUMAN

RIGHTS

U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1 (Rev. 1), U.N. Sales No. GV.E.97.0.16

19. See Report of the Commission on Human Security to the United Nations
Secretary-General, Human Security Now (May 1, 2003), at http://

www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter Human
Security Now] (emphasizing that respecting human rights and promoting
democratic principles are central to protection of security of peoples).
20. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 80-81, 113-19 (1999).

21. For overviews of the diverse theories of justice, with extensive
references to the vast literature, see CAMPBELL, supra note 15; KOLM, supra
note 15; 1 BRIAN BARRY, A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: THEORIES OF
JUSTICE (1989); JUSTICE (Thomas Morawetz ed.,
1991); AXEL
TSCHENTSCHER,

PROZEDURALE

THEORIEN

DER

GERECHTIGKEIT
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In the rights-based libertarian tradition, justice relates to
"natural individual rights" and corresponding limitations on
government powers in order to protect the autonomy and
independence of individuals who, as explained by
Immanuel Kant, must be treated as ends in themselves and
never merely as means for securing benefit to some other
person. While Anglo-American libertarians (such as John
Locke and Robert Nozick) conceive human rights (i.e., to
life, liberty, and property) and legitimate government
powers narrowly, modem European constitutional theories
seek to protect human liberty and personal selfdevelopment broadly as maximum equal freedoms subject
to democratic legislation that protects other human rights in
a non-discriminatory, necessary, and proportionate
22
manner.
- John Rawls's conception of "justice as fairness" and
"procedural justice" proceeds from a rational constitutional
choice among individuals behind a "veil of ignorance" in
order to define the basic rights and liberties of free and
equal citizens in a constitutional democracy.23 According
to Rawls's "welfare liberalism," rational citizens would
give priority to maximum equal liberty as the "first
principle of justice," but would also recognize the
"principle of fair equality of opportunity" and a "difference
principle" within a system of equal basic rights. 24 The
[PROCEDURAL

THEORIES

OF

JUSTICE]

(2000),

available

at

http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/gerechtigkeiteinleitung.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2003).
22. See Rejoinder to Alston, supra note 3.
23. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 73, 118-23.
24. Even though "[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system
of liberty for all," Rawls's concept of maximum equal liberty is narrower than
Kant's moral categorical imperative. Id. at 220. Equal liberties must be
protected before "[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity." Id. at 72. This "difference principle" is rationally
chosen by individuals in order to limit social and economic inequalities (which
inevitably result, for example, from the unequal distribution of human
capacities) and to provide a "social minimum" of resources for the least well-

414
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latter "secondary principles of social justice" are rationally
necessary for defining "the appropriate distribution of the
benefits and burdens of social cooperation" 25 so as to secure
a socially just distribution of welfare essential for the moral
and rational self-development of every person.
- Utilitarian theories of justice justify individual liberty and
equal opportunities for unfettered exchange between
individuals not in terms of constitutional contracts, but as
result-oriented mechanisms for attaining "welfare" in the
sense of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Yet,
whether market-driven distributions of goods and income
can maximize not only utility and efficiency, but also
"justice," is disputed because only human conduct but,
arguably,
not market-mechanisms (such as prices) can be
, , 26
"unjust.

- Communitarian theories of justice regard all values as
embedded in a particular social culture and emphasize
"deliberative democracy" and other democratic procedures
(rather than individual freedom) for determining social and
political community values, as illustrated by the socialist
maxim: "from each according to their ability, to each
according to their needs. 2 7
- Meritorian theories of justice combine notions of equality,
desert, and "corrective justice" (e.g., punishment and
compensation for injuries) in order to give "'to each
according to his or her due.' 28 Justice requires treating
off group through what Rawls calls the "transfer branch" of government. See
id. at 244.

25. Id. at 4.
26. See 2 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 31 (1976); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

149-294 (1974) (arguing that a person's "holdings" are just if they are the
result of legitimate actions in accordance with agreed rules of ownership,
transfer, and rectification of illegitimate transfers. The consequences of
unequal initial distribution of wealth and human capacities are ignored). For a
criticism of the economists' proclivity to look at outcomes rather than at rules,
see GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985); VIKTOR J. VANBERG, THE
CONSTITUTION OF MARKETS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
27. CAMPBELL, supra note 15, at 4.

28. Id. at 24.

(2001).
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individuals as rational agents responsible for their actions
and, therefore, rewarding or punishing their conduct.
The modem universal recognition of human rights limits the
various theories of justice by recognizing common moral and legal
core values (e.g., respect for human dignity, equal human worth,
democratic self-governance, and access to courts) which, as legal
entitlements of every human being independent from the
benevolence of governments, go far beyond the moral principles and
"global ethics" common to the various religions and moral
philosophies around the world.29 Justice is becoming a matter of
universal and inalienable human rights, democratic governance, and
positive national and international constitutional law in order to
empower and protect individual and democratic self-development
across frontiers. 30 The legal definition of justice in terms of equal
human rights is becoming ever more precise, and the legal
justification for inequalities in the distribution of benefits and
burdens is becoming ever more demanding. Even though democratic
legislation defining, balancing, and implementing human rights and
constitutional rights may differ legitimately from country to country,
there is an inalienable core of human rights that can no longer be
lawfully taken away by governments. Rawlsian justice, in the sense
of "the way in which the major social institutions distribute
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of
advantages from social cooperation," 3 ' continues to differ
legitimately from country to country. Beyond the self-evident rights
of life, liberty, and property recognized in constitutional democracies
and also in the UDHR, the major unresolved problems of
international justice relate to the internationallegal definition and
constitutional and judicial protection of non-discriminatory

29. See HANS KfiNG, A GLOBAL ETHIC FOR GLOBAL POLITICS AND

ECONOMICS (1998); A GLOBAL ETHIC AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: Two
DECLARATIONS (Hans Kiing & Helmut Schmidt eds., 1998); The Global Ethic
Foundation, World Religions, Universal Peace, Global Ethic (2002), at
http://www.weltethos.org/dat-eng/pdfLeng/we-ab'-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2003).
30. See CAMPBELL, supra note 15, at 53-54 (discussing "justice as human
rights"); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (analyzing
fundamental rights as legal and judicial "trumps").
31. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 6.
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conditions of competition and of fair equality of opportunities among
individuals and peoples in economic markets no less than in political
markets (i.e., the national and international constitution of markets
across frontiers.)
IV. JUSTICE AS EMPOWERMENT AND PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS
THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES

The diverse principles of justice and methods of justification
offered by modem liberal (i.e., liberty-based) theories of justice tend
to focus on three basic problems of "macro-justice" in societies (as
distinguished from "micro-justice" in individual cases):
(1)
principles and rules for the just allocation of equal freedoms and
other basic rights to individuals in order to protect human dignity and
peaceful cooperation among free citizens; (2) principles and rules for
the just distribution of scarce resources through private competition
and governmental correction of market failures; and (3) principles
and rules for a just constitutional order protecting general citizen
interests against government failures.
A. Maximum Equal Freedoms as the FirstPrincipleof Justice
In accordance with Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics32 (according
to which "justice is equality" based on formal principles (e.g., idem
cuique) as well as substantive principles (e.g., suum cuique)), human
rights require that justice be legally constituted by protection of equal
basic rights. For example, the liberal claim that "[m]en are bom and
remain free and equal in rights" (found in Article 1 of the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen), is universally
recognized in numerous U.N. human rights instruments.33 If the
modem universal recognition of inalienable core human rights is
recognized as a new constitutional contract fundamentally changing
the traditionally state-centered structures and contents of public
international law, maximum equal freedoms as a first principle of
justice no longer depends on "contractarian" or "non-contractarian"

32. Cf FRIEDRICH, supranote 11, at 19-26.
33. "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."
UDHR, supra note 13, art. 1.
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thought experiments (e.g., on "natural rights"), 34 but has become a
matter of positive national and international law.
The French Declaration defines liberty in terms of maximum
equal freedom: "[1]iberty consists in the freedom to do everything
which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of
each man has no limits except those which assure to the other
members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These
limits can only be determined by law." 35 This constitutional
guarantee of equal individual freedom subject to democratic
legislation is recognized in most constitutional democracies and in
international human rights law. It is protected either in terms of
individual rights to maximum equal freedom (as in Article 2:1 of the
German Basic Law), or in terms of an objective constitutional
requirement, often unwritten (as in the constitutional law of the U.S.
and some other Anglo-Saxon countries), of a legislative basis for
restrictions of freedom and other human rights (as in Article 29 of
the UDHR). 36 Respect for maximum equal "liberties-to-be" is of
existential importance for personal self-development in dignity and,
37
as explained in Kant's moral theory of the "categorical imperative,"
34. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 1, at 28. The two original positions used
by John Rawls for modeling negotiations on a national constitutional contract
among parties representing citizens, and negotiations on an international
constitutional contract among parties representing "liberal" or "decent
peoples," are contractarian theories which, similar to some non-contractarian
theories, emphasize the need for higher-level "constitutional rules" limiting
post-constitutional "lower-level law." Unlike this article, Rawls does not rely
on existing national and international constitutional law as a normative basis,
however imperfect, for a theory of justice. See id. at 102-68; RAWLS, supra
note 20, at 89-120.
35. THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE

CITIZEN (1789) art. 4, available at http://www.constitution.org/fr/frdrm.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
36. See, e.g., Fred L. Morrison & Robert E. Hudec, JudicialProtection of
Individual Rights under the Foreign Trade Laws of the United States, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 91
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993); C.B. MACPHERSON,
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 7 (1977).
37. See ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT (1999), for more on
Kant's moral "categorical imperatives" for acting in accordance with universal
laws ("'Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it become a universal law."' Id. at 17.), for respecting
human dignity by treating humanity as an end in itself ("'So act that you use
humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always at the same

418
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as well as in John Rawls's theory of justice,38 it also constitutes the
first principle of justice. "Liberties-to-be" must be distinguished
from instrumentalfreedoms ("liberties-to-have," produce, acquire,
sell, or consume), which may have a price rather than "dignity" (in
Kant's terms). Yet, economic liberties (such as free choice of one's
profession) and property rights also have an inalienable core in view
of their existential necessity for personal self-development. As
respect for human dignity requires that human beings be treated as
ends in themselves and as legal subjects rather than mere objects of
government policies (or as means to securing benefits to some other
person), individuals should be recognized as legal subjects in all
fields of international law, just as they are recognized as citizens and
holders of individual rights in all fields of EU law and of
constitutional democracies. 39 Hence, whereas some Anglo-American
constitutional theories on inalienable human rights to life, liberty,
and property tend to conceptualize individual liberty narrowly (e.g.,
in terms of basic personal freedoms of bodily movement and
democratic liberties), 40 European Community (EC) law rightly
recognizes individual producers, investors, traders, consumers, and
other "EU citizens" as legal subjects of European integration law
inside the EC.
Thus, maximum equal freedoms are no longer only a matter of
moral judgment and of rational constitutional choice, but also are
time as an end, never merely as a means."' Id. at 18.), and for respecting
individual autonomy ("'the idea of the will of every rational being as a will
giving universal law."' Id.), and on Kant's theory of the antagonistic human
nature promoting market competition and national and international
constitutional guarantees of equal freedoms. Kantian legal theory gives
priority to a legal duty of states to ensure conditions of maximum lawgoverned freedom over moral "duties of benevolence" to provide for the needs
of the citizens. Cf ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 217 (1993);
PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW, AND HAPPINESS 264 (2000).
38. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 1,at 47-101.

39. According to the German Constitutional Court, the "maxim 'man must
always be an end itself' applies without limitation for all areas of law; for the
dignity of a human being as a person, which cannot be lost, exists precisely in
the fact that he continues to be recognized as an autonomous personality."
Dierk Ullrich, ConcurringVisions: Human Dignity in the Canadian Charterof
Rights and Freedoms and the Basic Law of the FederalRepublic of Germany,
3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 75 (2003) (quoting BVerfGE 45, 187 at 22728).
40. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 15, at 56-59.
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positively recognized in national constitutions of EU member states
as well as in European constitutional law. For instance, in Article 1
of the German Basic Law of 1949, "[t]he German people...
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of
every community, of peace and of justice in the world."'41 These
"basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the
judiciary as directly applicable law." 42 Maximum equal freedoms
are recognized as individual rights and objective constitutional
principles in Article 2: "[e]very person shall have the right to free
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the
rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral
law." 43 According to the EU Treaty (Article 6) and the EU Charter,
"the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, ' 4 each of which serve as
the legal basis for specific dignity rights (chapter I), liberty rights
(chapter II), equality rights (chapter III), solidarity rights (chapter
IV), citizens' rights (chapter V), and access to justice guarantees
(chapter VI of the EU Charter).
B. Freedoms of Trade and Basic Social Rights as Secondary
PrinciplesofJustice
Wherever existential liberty rights are protected, markets and
competition emerge spontaneously in response to consumer demand
for scarce goods and services. Based on "the principle of an open
market economy with free competition"''45 and "freedom to conduct' 46a
business in accordance with Community law and national laws,
national and European constitutional law in the EU protect free
movement of goods, services, persons, capital, related payments, and
non-discrimination as individual fundamental rights and
corresponding government obligations so as to guarantee an "internal
market... without internal frontiers in which the free movement of

41. Art. 1,para. 2GG.
42. Id. para. 3.
43. Id. art. 2, para. 1.

44. EU CHARTER, supra note 2, pmbl.
45. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) arts. 4, 98, 105 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
46. EU CHARTER, supra note 2, art. 16.
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goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. 'A 7 Just as human
dignity is indivisible, the indivisibility of all human rights is
recognized in EU law as well as in international law.48 The market
freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty can be understood as specific
manifestations of "freedoms of trade, ' 49 deriving ultimately from an
indivisible, basic "right to liberty.",50 The progressive extension of
international legal and judicial guarantees for mutually beneficial
economic cooperation among citizens across frontiers is the central
objective of World Trade Organization (WTO) law and of the
already more than 250 free trade areas, customs unions, and other
economic integration agreements concluded by WTO Members.
In constitutional democracies and also in EC law, "process
freedoms" 51 are supplemented by numerous rules and government
47. EC TREATY, supranote 45, art. 14.
48. See EU CHARTER, supra note 2, pmbl.; Vienna Declaration and
Programme ofAction, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] ("All human rights
are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated."). See also
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, On 'Indivisibility'of Human Rights, 14 EuR. J. INT'L
L. 381 (2003).
49. See, e.g., Case 240/83, Procureur de la Rrpublique v. Association de
defense des brfleurs d'huiles usagres, 1985 E.C.R. 531, 548 ("[T]he principles

of free movement of goods and freedom of competition, together with freedom
of trade as a fundamental right, are general principles of Community law of
which the Court ensures observance."). Moreover, the freedom of movement
of workers and other persons, access to employment, and the right of
establishment have been described by the EC Court as "fundamental
freedoms" or rights. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37, [1996] CEC
(CCH) 175, 193 (1995); Case 222/86, Union Nationale des Entraineurs et
Cadres Techniques Professionnels du Football v. Heylens & Ors., 1987 E.C.R.
4097, 14, [1989] 1 CEC (CCH) 131, 145 (1987) (free access to employment
is "a fundamental right which the Treaty confers individually on each worker
in the Community."). The E.C.J. rightly avoids human rights language for the
constitutional "market freedoms," the right to property, and the freedom to
pursue a trade or business in EC law.
50. EU CHARTER, supra note 2, art. 6. See, e.g., art. 2, para. 1 GG
(granting the individual right to general freedom of action and free
development of a person's personality, which has been recognized by the
courts to protect individual rights, such as importing and exporting goods and
services subject to democratic legislation). On the legal and procedural
advantages and problems of such a broad constitutional guarantee of general
individual freedom, see ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 223-59 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002).
51. Cf.KOLM, supra note 15, at 13.
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interventions aimed at correcting market failures and supplying
public goods, such as: "a system ensuring that competition in the
internal market is not distorted, ' 5 2 "[e]nvironmental protection...
with a view to promoting sustainable development," 53 "fundamental
social rights, 54 and health and consumer protection." The EC's
wasteful and discriminatory agricultural policy illustrates that the
EC's redistributive policies do not focus on the principle of
"maximizing the minimum" of the most deprived people, a concept
which various theories of justice postulate as a secondary principle of
justice.56 European constitutional law recognizes, at both national
and EU levels, a variety57 of solidarity obligations to promote
satisfaction of basic needs.
While the core of existential equal liberties is recognized as
inalienable, instrumentalmarket freedoms are much more subject to
legal regulation that balances diverse human rights and private and
public interests. 8 Where respect for, and protection of, human
dignity are recognized as constitutional obligations of governments,
respect for the core of economic liberty rights and protection of
social human rights to satisfy basic needs ("distributive justice") can
be interpreted as legal consequences of an indivisible
obligation to
59
protect individual self-development in dignity.
52. EC TREATY, supra note 45, art. 3(1)(g).
53. Id. art. 6.
54. Id. art. 136.
55. Id. arts. 152, 153.
56. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 1, at 52-73.
57. Cf, e.g., EU CHARTER, supra note 2, arts. 27-36.
58. Cf Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and Liberalisation of
Markets: The Social Responsibility of International Organisations to Make
Market Competition and Social Rights Mutually Consistent, in THE STATE AND
NEW SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN A GLOBALISING WORLD (2003).
59.

Cf COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN

(1998). Whereas most courts have avoided legal definitions of the
concept of human dignity (such as whether human dignity should be
understood as an intrinsic value inherent to personhood or as an extrinsic value
dependent on merit or achievement), the German Federal Constitutional Court
has determined human dignity not only in negative terms (i.e., by deciding
case-by-case on infringements) but also by adopting the "object formula": "it
contradicts human dignity to turn man into a mere object within the state."
Ulirich, supra note 39 (quoting BVerfGE 45, 187 at 227-28). See also
DIGNITY

RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO
THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 20-46 (Christian Starck ed., 1987) (discussing the
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C. ConstitutionalRights to Democratic Governance and
ConstitutionalOrder as ThirdPrincipleofJustice
National and international human rights law recognizes (e.g., in
Article 29 of the UDHR) the need for democratic legislation and
constitutional rules protecting, implementing, and balancing human
rights (e.g., on the basis of constitutional principles of nondiscrimination, necessity, proportionality, due process of law,
individual access to courts, and democratic governance). 60 The
democratic balancing process, in its implementation of legislation
and institutions, may differ legitimately from country to country
depending on the preferences of their citizens and of their democratic
institutions. They must be guided, however, by human rights, not
only in their function as individual rights (e.g., of a "negative,"
"positive," procedural, or participatory nature) and the corresponding
obligations of national governments and intergovernmental
organizations to respect and protect human rights, but also as
objective principles of constitutional order to be respected by public
and private actors in all areas of the polity and of the economy. 6 1 As
emphasized by the European Court of Human Rights, human rights
treaties are now part of an objective "constitutional order," based no
longer exclusively on states, but also on individuals as legal
subjects.62
Human rights, and the reciprocal obligations of governments, do
not end at national borders. U.N. human rights law recognizes that
"[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the
judicial protection by the German Constitutional Court of maximum equal
freedoms in terms of economic liberty rights).
60. See DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (discussing the
emerging "human right to democratic governance"); Eric Stein, International
Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489
(2001). On empirical evidence that democracies very seldom fight each other,
and on the reasons why constitutional democracy and accountability tend to
limit abuses of foreign and military policies, see PAUL K. HUTH & TODD L.
ALLEE, THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (2003).

61. For examples of these various "individual" and "objective" functions of
human rights, see ALEXY, supra note 50; RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 59.
62. Cf.Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995).
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rights and freedoms.., can be fully realized. 63 Enjoyment of
human rights depends on production and distribution of scarce goods
and services whose availability, quality, and accessibility can be
increased through international trade. As the division of labor
necessary for satisfying consumer demand requires constitutional
rules limiting "market failures" and enabling the collective supply of
"public goods" (such as "democratic peace"), U.N. human rights
instruments also rightly emphasize that "[d]emocracy, development
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are
interdependent and mutually reinforcing." 64 The widespread poverty
and human rights violations outside the thirty market-based
democracies cooperating in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) demonstrate, however, that
these human rights objectives and constitutional democracy are not
realized effectively in many U.N. member states. In contrast to the
"human rights conditionality" of EU membership (as illustrated by
Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the EU Treaty), the human rights obligations
of all U.N. member states are not effectively protected and enforced
in many states.
V. THE EC AND WTO AGREEMENTS AS "INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC CoNsTITUTioNs"

Parts I to IV concluded that in modem international law, as well
as inside constitutional democracies and in EU law, justice as a legal
concept must be defined and legally protected by constitutional
guarantees of human rights and citizen rights. As human rights
protect individual and democratic diversity, effective protection of
human rights inevitably gives rise to market-based information
mechanisms and coordination mechanisms whose proper functioning
requires national and international constitutional constraints of
"market failures" as well as of "government failures" in economic
markets no less than in "political markets."
63. UDHR, supra note 13, art. 28. See also Declaration on the Right to
Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986).
64. Vienna Declaration,supra note 48, 8. These interrelationships are
explained in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Economics, Human
Rights and the Future of the WTO, 58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr: SWISS REv. OF
INT'L ECON. REL. 49 (2003).
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A. The EC Treaty as a Regional "Economic Constitution"
According to Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of the Citizen: "[a]ny society in which no provision is
made for guaranteeing rights or for the separation of powers, has no
Constitution., 65 The Court of Justice of the European Communities
(E.C.J.) emphasizes that the EC is "a Community based on the rule
of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can
avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by
them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the
Treaty." 66 The EC Treaty's legal and judicial guarantees of freedom,
non-discrimination, consumer-driven competition, democratic
governance, and judicial protection of individual rights in the internal
market assert legal primacy, direct effect, and "direct applicability"
for the benefit of EC citizens; these guarantees have also set up a
comprehensive constitutional system of horizontal and vertical, legal
and institutional checks and balances aimed at protecting equal
individual rights. The EC and EU Treaties thus serve as:
- an "economic constitution" for "an open market economy
with free competition"; 67 and
- a "political constitution" guaranteeing human rights,
democratic governance, and an "area of freedom, security
and justice" 68 in the EU.
The EU Charter, and its incorporation into the draft treaty
establishing a constitution for Europe, confirm the E.C.J.'s oftenrepeated statement that:
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general
principles of law.., for that purpose, the Court draws
inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by
international treaties for the protection of human rights on

65. THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE
CITIZEN, supra note 35, art. 16.
66. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365.
67. EC TREATY, supra note 45, art. 4.
68. EU TREATY, supra note 5, art. 2. See also id. arts. 6, 7, 49 (regarding
human rights and democracy, breaches by member states, and admissions of
states into the union).

Fall 2003]

JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, & MARKETS

425

which the Member 69States have collaborated or to which
they are signatories.
EU law also illustrates that the lack of a demos at the
international level is no reason for limiting democratic participation
by individuals and by non-governmental organizations in intergovernmental decision-making processes that affect individual rights
and social welfare.
B. The WTO Agreement as a Worldwide "Economic Constitution"
The ever-increasing number of international treaties constituting
worldwide organizations, the legal primacy of their respective
"constitutional charters" over "secondary law" and also, in the case
of the U.N. Charter, over other conflicting treaty rules, 70 and the
separation and mutual "checks and balances" among the legislative,
executive, and judicial organs of international organizations
(sometimes with compulsory international jurisdiction, such as in the
WTO and the Law of the Sea Convention) have promoted the
emergence of "international constitutional law" on the worldwide
level. 7 ' This progressive "constitutionalization" is not limited to
international treaty law but, as illustrated by the universal recognition
of jus cogens,72 of erga omnes obligations," and of an inalienable
core of human rights, extends also to general international law.
The law of some worldwide and regional organizations, such as
the U.N. Charter and the constitutions of the International Labor
Organizations (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
69. Grdinne de Bfirca, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, in TEN
15 (Bruno de
Witte ed., 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth020403
_en.pdf.
70. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
71. See, e.g., Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national
Governance-Possibilities for and Limits to the Development of an
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE 11,

International Constitutional Law, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 170 (2001);

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism, InternationalLaw and "We the
Peoples of the United Nations", in TRADITION UND WELTOFFENHEIT DES
RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFr FOR HELMUT STEINBERGER

291 (Hans-Joachim Cremer

et al., 2001).
72. E.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
73. E.g., Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
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U.N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
explicitly refer to human rights.74 Yet, the general international law
requirement to construe international treaties in conformity with
general international law rules applicable among the parties
concerned 75 requires that construction of the law of international
organizations be in conformity with the human rights obligations of
their member states. Conventional and general international law
thereby interact dynamically, especially on the level of human rights
and constitutional rules.
For instance, the Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work adopted by all ILO
members in June, 1998, recognizes:
that all Members, even if they have not ratified the
Conventions in question, have an obligation arising from
the very fact of membership in the Organization, to respect,
to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the Constitution, the principles concerning the
fundamental rights which are the subject of those
Conventions, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation. 76

74. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; Constitution of the International

Labour Organisation, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 225 Consol. T.S. 378;
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275; Constitution of the World Health
Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S.
185.
75. See Vienna Convention, supra note 72, art. 31 (according to the WTO
Appellate Body, article 31 reflects customary rules of international treaty
interpretation).
76. International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principlesand Rights at Work, 86th Sess., 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237-38 (1998).
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The 1994 Agreement establishing the WTO 77 includes all four
categories of constitutional elements in modem international law:
(1) it constitutes international organs with legislative, executive, and
judicial powers which interact in an interdependent legal framework
of "checks and balances"; (2) in the event of a conflict between the
WTO Agreement and any of the numerous multilateral trade
agreements annexed to it, "the provision of this Agreement shall
prevail to the extent of the conflict;, 78 (3) the substantive WTO
guarantees of freedom of trade, non-discriminatory conditions of
competition, rule of law, and access to courts serve "constitutional
functions" for protecting freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law,
and access to courts not only in intergovernmental relations among
states, but also in "cosmopolitan relations" among competing
producers, investors, traders, consumers, and their respective
governments at home and abroad; 79 and (4) the compulsory
jurisdiction of WTO dispute settlement bodies has given rise to
hundreds of WTO dispute settlement proceedings and WTO
jurisprudence clarifying and further developing WTO rules, thereby
progressively extending legal security and rule of law across
frontiers. Similar to the German Constitutional Court,8° the E.C.J.,

77. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
78. Id. art. XVI.
79. As goods and services are produced and consumed by individuals,
WTO dispute settlement panels have emphasized that "one of the primary
objects of the GATr/WTO... is to produce certain market conditions which
would allow.., individual activity to flourish" by protecting the international
division of labor against discriminatory trade restrictions and other distortions.
See WTO Panel Report on United States-Sections 301-3 10 of the Trade Act of
1974,
Dec.
22,
1999,
WT/DS152/R,
7.73,
available
at

http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/WTOP/1999/6.html.
80. See, e.g., Rechtsschutz gegen Maflnahmen des Europiiischen
Patentamts, 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOcHENscI-RIFT 2705, 2705-06 (2001)
(discussing the recent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in a
complaint by a German citizen against the European Patent Office in Munich
in which the Court emphasized its task to ensure respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Germany, but dismissed the constitutional complaint
on the ground that the international legal order of the European Patent
Organization offered standards of legal and judicial review that were
sufficiently equivalent to those in German law).
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and the European Court of Human Rights,81 WTO dispute settlement
bodies increasingly apply general international law principles (e.g.,
of good faith, proportionality, due process of law) that are not
specifically mentioned in WTO law. Human rights, however, are
neither referred to in the WTO Constitution nor are they referred
to,
82
thusfar, inthe legal findings of WTO dispute settlement bodies.
VI. THE HUMAN-RIGHTS APPROACH TO WTO LAW ADVOCATED BY

U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Neither the U.N. Charter nor the law of U.N. Specialized
Agencies guarantee a stable legal framework for a welfareincreasing, international division of labor based on rule of law and
compulsory international jurisdiction for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. For more than half a century, U.N. law has manifestly
failed to realize, in the majority of its 191 U.N. member states, its
declared objectives of "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all," and "creation of
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations."83 Recent U.N.
resolutions recognize the interrelationships between human rights,
84
consumer-driven competition, and citizen-driven democracies.
Nevertheless, the numerous non-democratic U.N. member
governments make it politically difficult for the U.N. and U.N.
Specialized Agencies to follow the approach of regional
organizations in Europe and North America which explicitly
condition market integration on respect for human rights and
constitutional democracy. Some U.N. bodies (like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank) have committed
themselves to principles of "good governance," yet without linking
THE

such benevolent government approachesto respect for human rights,

consumer-driven

competition,

democratic

governance,

and

81. For references to the relevant case law, see Walter, supra note 71;
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, TIME FOR INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
THE LAW OF WORLDWIDE ORGANIZATIONS 24-25 (Jean Monnet Program,

Working Paper No. 7/01, 2001).
82. See Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and the Law of the World
Trade Organization,37 J. WORLD TRADE 241, 243, 246 (2003).
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
84. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration,supra note 48.
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constitutional restraints. Government discretion to define the "public
interest" in a manner discriminating among domestic citizens and
reducing consumer welfare prevails in most U.N. member states,
including: (1) foreign policy discretion to apply discriminatory and
welfare-reducing border restrictions; (2) parliamentarydiscretion to
redistribute income among domestic citizens through discriminatory
regulation of the domestic economy in favor of powerful producer
interests; and (3) judicial discretion to interpret and apply domestic
law without regard to the international legal obligations of states or
the EC.
U.N. human rights bodies often include non-democratic
governments and neglect the functional interrelationships between
human rights, consumer-welfare, and democracy. 5 For example, a
2001 report for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights discredited
the WTO as "a veritable nightmare" for developing countries and
women86 without regard to the numerous "public interest provisions"
in WTO law that enable WTO Members to fulfill their human rights
obligations in conformity with WTO law. In response to the
widespread criticism of the anti-market bias of such "nightmare
reports," the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights recently
published three more differentiated reports analyzing human rights
dimensions of the WTO Agreements on Trade-Related Intellectual
88
87
Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA)

85. See Petersmann, supra note 82. In 2002, Libya, a country known for its
disregard of human rights, presided over the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights.
86. The Realization ofEconomic, Social and CulturalRights: Globalization
and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 52d
15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4,
(2000) [hereinafter Globalization and Its Impact]. Apart from a reference to
patents and their possibly adverse effects on pharmaceutical prices (depending
on the competition, patent, and social laws of the countries concerned), the
report nowhere identifies conflicts between WTO rules and human rights.
87. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc.
ESCOR, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001).
88. Globalization and Its Impact, supra note 86.
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and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 89 The
reports call for a "human rights approach to trade" which:
(a) Sets the promotion and protection of human rights
among the objectives of trade liberalization [not
exceptions];
(b) Examines the effects of trade liberalization on
individuals and seeks to devise trade law and policy to take
into account the rights of all individuals, in particular
vulnerable individuals and groups;
(c) Emphasizes the role of the State in the process of
liberalization - not only as negotiators of trade law and
setters of trade policy, but also as the primary duty bearer
for the implementation of human rights;
(d) Seeks consistency between the progressive liberalization
of trade and the progressive realization of human rights;
(e) Requires a constant examination of the impact of trade
liberalization on the enjoyment of human rights;
(f) Promotes international cooperation for the realization of
human rights and freedoms in the context of trade
90
liberalization.
The High Commissioner emphasizes the human rights
obligations of all W'1TO Members deriving, inter alia, from the
ratification, by every WTO member state, of one or more of the six
major worldwide U.N. human rights conventions. 9 ' The reports
differentiate between obligations to respect human rights (e.g., by
refraining from interfering in the enjoyment of such rights), to
protect human rights (e.g., by preventing violations of such rights by
third parties), and to fulfill human rights (e.g., by taking appropriate
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, and other measures
towards the full realization of such rights). As enjoyment of human
rights (e.g., to food, health, education, and development) depends on
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of traded goods
and services, the relevance of WTO rules on market access, on
89. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Liberalization of Trade in
Services and Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (2002).
90. Id. at 2.
91. See Human Rights Conventions, supra note 16.
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limitations of "market failures" (e.g., in case of essential services,
anti-competitive price increases or output restrictions), as well as of
"government failures" for the protection and fulfillment of human
rights, is acknowledged and discussed. The reports rightly underline
that references in numerous WTO provisions to rights of WTO
Members to regulate may in fact be duties to regulate under human
rights law (e.g., so as to protect and fulfill human rights of access to
water, medicines, health, and educational services at affordable
The U.N. High Commissioner suggests recognizing
prices).
promotion of human rights as an objective of the WTO so as to
ensure that trade rules and policies advance the protection and
promotion of human rights.92
VII. NEED FOR CLARIFYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In Europe, human rights are recognized as "constitutional
restraints" on government powers, not only at the national level, but
also at the level of international organizations which exercise
government powers collectively through intergovernmental,
parliamentary, or judicial organs. Long before human rights were
explicitly incorporated into the primary law and secondary law of the
EU, the EC Court of Justice had construed the common human rights
guarantees of EC member states as constituting general constitutional
principles limiting the regulatory powers of the EC.9 3 The European
Court of Human Rights has likewise held:
Where States establish international organisations, or
mutatis mutandis international agreements, to pursue
cooperation in certain fields of activities, there may be
implications for the protection of fundamental rights. It
would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the
[European Convention on Human Rights] if Contracting
92. See Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Liberalization of Trade in
Services and Human Rights, supra note 89, at 2.
93. In InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft mbH, the E.C.J. held that respect
for human rights forms an integral part of the general principles of Community
law: "[TIhe protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community." Case 11/70,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle ftir
Getreide und Futtermittel, 16 E.C.R. 1125, 1135 (1970).
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States were thereby absolved from their responsibility
under the Convention in relation to the field of activity
covered by such attribution.9"
The U.N. Charter includes explicit human rights obligations for
U.N. member states, 95 which, in case of conflict, assert legal primacy
over other international treaties. 96 The U.N. institutions (e.g., the
ICJ) have, however, failed so far to specify the exact scope of the
expanding human rights obligations of all U.N. member states and
U.N. organs under the U.N. Charter. The laws of many U.N.
specialized agencies (such as the IMF and the World Bank) and of
other worldwide organizations (such as the WTO) do not mention
human rights. Yet, all their member states have accepted human
rights obligations under international treaty law as well as under
general international law. Additionally, all U.N. members have
recognized, for instance, in various U.N. resolutions like the UDHR,
that: "[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realized., 97 Hence, the U.N. resolutions on the "right to
development" define development in terms of fulfillment of basic
needs and human rights.98 If, as universally recognized in Principle
1 of the "Rio Declaration" of the U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, "[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom,
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being," 99 such rights
94. T.I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98 2000-111 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
15, available at http://ehcr.coe.int/eng. In Matthews v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights found the United Kingdom in violation of
the human right to participate in free elections of the legislature even though
the law which denied voting rights in Gibraltar implemented a treaty among
EC member states on the election of the European Parliament: "[T]here is no
difference between European and domestic legislation, and no reason why the
United Kingdom should not be required to 'secure' the rights... [under the
ECHR] in respect of European legislation, in the same way as those rights are
required to be 'secured' in respect of purely domestic legislation." Matthews
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 361, 362 (1999).
95. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
96. Id. art. 103.
97. UDHR, supra note 13, art. 28.
98. See, e.g., Declarationon the Right to Development, supra note 63.
99. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex
I, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) (1992).
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and "sustainable development" must be respected and promoted not
only by national governments, but also by intergovernmental
organizations.
Even though 191 states have ratified the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child,' 00 only 137 have accepted the U.N. Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Human Rights.' 0 1 The U.N.
Convention on the Human Rights of Migrant Workers and their
Families has been ratified so far by only twenty-two U.N. member
states.10 2 Following the example of the 1998 ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 10 3 which clarified the
constitutional obligations of all ILO member states to respect certain
ILO core labor standards regardless of their ratification of the
respective ILO conventions concerned, the U.N. and the ICJ should
likewise clarify the extent to which U.N. member states and
international organizations are obligated today (under the U.N.
Charter and under general international law) to respect and protect
civil, political, economic, and social human rights even if they have
not ratified the relevant U.N. human rights conventions concerned.
VIII. NEED FOR CLARIFYING THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN MARKETS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,

AND INTEGRATION LAW

Economic and political markets emerge wherever personal
autonomy and diversity (e.g., of individual capacities and
preferences) of investors, producers, traders, consumers, and other
citizens are respected. Effective protection of liberty rights, property
rights, and other human rights also protects the "market forces" of
individual demand and supply of scarce goods, services, and job
100. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 16.
101. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 16.
102. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratification of the InternationalConvention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/igrants.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
103. International Labour Organisation, ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour Conference, 86th Sess.,
37
I.L.M.
1233,
available at
June
19,
1998,
Geneva,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/declaration/text (last visited
Oct. 4, 2003).
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opportunities necessary for the enjoyment of human rights, and
inevitably gives rise to spontaneous emergence of "equilibrium
prices" coordinating demand and supply.
Like families and other social institutions, markets, in their
diverse functions (e.g., as information mechanism, social dialogue
about values, competition among suppliers and consumers), are
inevitable complements of human rights. Their efficiency depends
on the proper assignment of property rights (such as protecting the
freedom to have and use resources exclusively), transaction rights
(such as to acquire, sell, buy, and transfer property titles in scarce
resources), liberty rights (e.g., freedom of opinion, freedom of
choice), and other framework rules for the individual and collective
supply and consumption of private and public goods, and for the
legal protection and enforcement of individual rights. The diversity
of national democracies and of regional integration agreements
confirms that the empowerment and protection of citizens through
the legal constitution of mutually beneficial markets may differ from
country to country in response to the particular value preferences and
constitutional traditions of their citizens. Yet, there are common core
values and functional inter-relationships between markets, basic
individual rights, and international integration law, which it is
important to clarify and better understand.
A. "NormativeIndividualism" as Value Premise of Human Rights
andMarket IntegrationLaw
Since the beginnings of written history, marketplaces have been
described as cultural centers, not only for the exchange of economic
goods, but also for the exchange of social services and political ideas
(e.g., the agora in classical Athens during the 5th century BC).
Limited knowledge, scarcity of resources, and the natural tendency
of pursuing one's self-interest through social cooperation and
division of labor prompt most individuals to specialize in the
production of scarce goods and services and to exchange the fruits of
their labor for other goods and services necessary for survival and
personal self-development. Consumer demand, market prices, and
competition inform and induce investors, producers, and traders to
use production factors and allocate resources in a manner enabling
mutually profitable exchanges and supply of demand. Also, the
modem globalization of markets through international movements of
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goods, services, persons, and investments has enabled trading
countries to increase their national economic welfare, to reduce
absolute poverty inside countries, and to satisfy diversity of
individual supply and
demand for economic as well as non-economic
10 4
goods and services.
Like markets, the idea and legal recognition of "basic individual
rights," "fundamental rights," and "human rights" goes back to the
beginnings of written history. Precursors include: the rights to
asylum granted by Greek city-states, Roman citizenship rights, rights
of the nobility and of freedom of trade in the Middle Ages, religious
freedom guaranteed in the constitutional charter adopted by the
Dutch provincial assembly at Dordrecht in 1572, the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679 and Bill of Rights of 1689, the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, and the
°
Bill of Rights appended to the United States Constitution in 1791 105
The particular focus of liberty rights (e.g., freedom of religion,
freedom of association, freedom to demonstrate, and freedom of
trade) often was shaped by historical events (such as the schism of
the Christian church from the 16th century onwards) and by political
struggles against rulers. Liberation of citizens from discriminatory,
welfare-reducing border barriers and transnational protection of
freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law, democratic governance,
social justice, and mutually-beneficial cooperation across frontiers
are the human rights challenges of the 21 st century.
The common core of markets and of human rights rests on
"normative individualism" (i.e., respect for personal autonomy,
individual diversity, and the dependence of values on individual
preferences and consent). 10 6 The Kantian moral "categorical
imperative"'10 7 of maximizing equal liberties across frontiers justifies
104. See World Bank, Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an
Inclusive World Economy (2002), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/
prr/globalization/text-2857.
105. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; THE MAGNA CARTA OF 1215,
available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm (last visited Sept.
16, 2003); FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE
CITIZEN, supra note 35.
106. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 26, at 21-25 (discussing
individuals as sources of value in economics); JOHN B. DAvIS, THE THEORY OF
THE INDIVIDUAL IN ECONOMICS: IDENTITY AND VALUE (2003).
107. See supratext accompanying note 37.
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both the human rights objective of empowering and protecting
individuals through equal constitutional rights and the economic
objective of promoting freedom of choice and satisfaction of
consumer demand through voluntary exchanges and open markets.
Human rights, consumer-driven economic markets, and citizendriven political markets are all designed to protect and promote
individual sovereignty (e.g., consumer sovereignty and citizen
sovereignty) based on voluntary cooperation in economic and
political markets reflecting social dialogues about values. According
to Kant's legal philosophy, the antagonistic natures of diverse
individual interests and of the legal protection of equal basic rights
are likely to promote welfare-increasing cooperation and
competition, not only in economic markets, but also in the
progressive "constitutionalization" of national
and international
10 8
states.
and
citizens
among
relations
political
B. Non-DiscriminatoryCompetition andMulti-Level
Constitutionalismas Common Core Values ofHuman Rights
andMarket IntegrationLaw
Human rights proceed from the premise that human dignity
entitles every human being to equal freedoms and human rights that
need to be legally protected through non-discriminatory democratic
legislation. Human rights include individual and democratic rights to
differ from and to compete with other people; their legal protection
inevitably gives rise to competition among individuals as well as
among democracies with different constitutional preferences and
traditions. The resulting conflicts of interests-for instance, between
utility-maximizing producers and consumers in economic markets
and among citizens and self-interested politicians in political
markets--create governance problems (such as non-discriminatory
competition) which require constitutional restraints on abuses of
power. The welfare-increasing effects of economic and political
competition (e.g., as spontaneous information mechanism, "voice"
and "exit options" vis-A-vis abuses of power) depend on protection of
human rights and of non-discriminatory conditions of competition
108. On the Kantian theory of national and international constitutionalism,
see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to ConstitutionalizeInternationalLaw and
ForeignPolicyfor the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-11
(1998).
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through an "economic constitution" no less than through a "political
The universal recognition of human rights has
constitution."
contributed to the universal adoption of national constitutions in
almost all states of the world and also, increasingly, to the
recognition of international competition rules (such as in EC, North
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and WTO law) and
international constitutional rules (e.g., in U.N. human rights law and
EU law) aimed at protecting non-discriminatory conditions of
international trade, competition, and a cosmopolitan, international
"civil society" (based on human rights and, in the EU, also on nondiscriminatory EU citizen rights).' 0 9
The increasing integration of national markets is based on
regional and worldwide integration law (notably WTO law) limiting
discriminatory national border restrictions and protecting nondiscriminatory economic competition across frontiers. Domestic
political pressures for protection of human rights, constitutional
democracy, and open markets lead to the increasing
"constitutionalization" of traditionally state-centered international
relations, notably in European integration law and in the
jurisprudence of international courts (such as the European Court of
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, WTO dispute
settlement panels, and the WTO Appellate Body) which promote an
increasing "internationalization" of formerly domestic constitutional
law concepts (like non-discrimination, necessity, and proportionality
of government restrictions on transnational trade). One of the most
important lessons of the EC Treaty guarantees of free movement of
goods, services, persons, capital, and non-discriminatory competition
was that international guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination,
and other human rights, and their judicial protection by international
courts (like the EC Court and the European Court of Human Rights)
can extend the protection of fundamental freedoms across frontiers
and introduce reciprocally agreed upon constitutional reforms "top
down" (like freedom of trade inside the EC); these reforms are often
politically impossible to realize through unilateralnational reforms
109. See generally EUROPEAN

CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

(Massimo La Torre ed., 1998). Such international "citizen rights" and "multilevel constitutionalism," with legal primacy over national law, go far beyond
Kant's proposals for "cosmopolitan rights to hospitality" and an international
confederation among republican states to defend "democratic peace".
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and struggles for individual rights "bottom up." By empowering and
legally protecting individual citizens and economic actors against
abuses of government powers, international economic law, like
international human rights law, can serve "constitutional functions"
for overcoming "constitutional failures" of national legal systems
which, for centuries, have discriminated against foreigners and
against foreign goods, services, and capital movements in a way that
reduces economic welfare and individual freedom at home and
abroad." 0
C. IndividualRights as Policy Instrumentsfor ConstitutingMarkets
and PromotingInvestments, Competition, and Social Welfare

Between 1990 and 2001, fifty-four U.N. member countries
suffered negative economic growth.'

Most of these countries (such

as those in sub-Saharan Africa) had governments which did not
effectively protect human rights, rules-based market competition,
and democratic governance." 2 The modern economic insight that
human rights make individuals not only better democratic citizens,
but also "better economic actors," 13 is important for empowering
and protecting mutually beneficial economic cooperation among
individuals at national levels. Respect for human rights, rule of law,
and constitutional safeguards (such as parliamentary and judicial
control) also offers legal and constitutional remedies against abuses
of the limited powers delegated to international organizations, in
which human rights are often less effectively protected than inside
constitutional democracies. In the European Union, the progressive
evolution from a sectoral coal and steel community toward a customs
110. This

was

CONSTITUTIONAL

the

central

FUNCTIONS

thesis of ERNST-ULRICH
AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

PETERSMANN,
PROBLEMS
OF

(1991).
111. Human Development Report 2003 Millennium Development Goals: A
Compact Among Nations to End Human Poverty, U.N. Development
Programme, at 2 (2003), U.N. Doc. DP(058)/H8/2003, available at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_complete.pdf.
112. See Human Security Now, supra note 19.
113. Mark Malloch Brown, Forewordto Human Development Report 2000
Human Rights and Human Development-for Freedom and Solidarity, U.N.
Development Programme, at iii (2000), U.N. Doc. DP(058)/H81/ARM/2000,
availableat http://www.undp.org/hdr2000/english/book/ch0.pdf.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
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union, common market, monetary union, and political union with a
"common foreign and security policy" was democratically
acceptable for national parliaments, citizens, and national
constitutional courts (such as in Germany) only because of the
simultaneous transformation of the EC Treaty into a "treaty
constitution" committed to the protection of human rights,
democratic peace, "citizenship of the Union,"114 social justice, and
judicial review of the rule of law inside the EC.
Legal doctrine has long neglected that human rights constitute
not only moral and legal rights (e.g., of a defensive, procedural,
participatory, or redistributive nature), but also corresponding
obligations of governments at national and international levels, and
objective principles of justice necessary for protecting "democratic
peace" and for limiting abuses of power also by non-state actors
(e.g., freedom of association in labor markets). 1 5 The decentralized
information, incentive, coordination, enforcement, and legitimacy
functions of human rights for rendering economic and political
competition more effective (and for solving social problems
confronting all societies, such as promoting the welfare-increasing
division of labor, social justice, and the overall consistency of legal
systems in a manner respecting and protecting individual selfdevelopment, responsibility, and human dignity) are often not
adequately understood by economists and lawyers." 6
While
economists often focus on outcomes rather than on the rules shaping
the outcomes, human rights "fundamentalists" often focus onesidedly on civil and political rights constituting "political markets"

114. Neither in the EC nor in most federal states (including the U.S.) has the

constitutional doctrine of limited delegation of powers prevented everexpanding and increasingly vague delegations to the higher (federal) level.
Judicial protection of human rights and open markets may offer more effective
constitutional safeguards of individual liberties and deregulation than the
constitutional doctrines of limited delegation of powers and of subsidiarity.
115. On these diverse functions of human rights, see ALEXY, supra note 50;
RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 59.
116. See RANDY E. BARNETr, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND
RULE OF LAW (1998) (discussing the instrumental function of human
rights for dealing with the problems of limited knowledge, conflicting
interests, and abuses of power).
THE
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(e.g., democracy) without according similar importance
to economic
' 17
and social rights constituting "economic markets." "
If unnecessary human poverty, the dependence of personal selfdevelopment in dignity on economic resources and professional
freedom, and the need for constitutional limitations of abuses of
economic power are recognized as interrelated human rights
problems, then human rights law can be perceived as an instrument
for empowering individuals and protecting their human dignity no
less in economic markets than in political markets.
This
"instrumental function" of constitutional rights is particularly evident
in EC law, which realized its Treaty objective of an "internal
market.., without internal frontiers" 118 to a large extent by relying
'119
on the "vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights
and by empowering individuals to enforce, through national courts
and the EC Court of Justice, intergovernmental EC Treaty rules as
"fundamental freedoms" of "market citizens" protecting free
movements of goods,2 0 services, persons, capital, and related payments
as individual rights.1
1. Human rights as instruments for reducing the
problem of limited knowledge
Human rights (for example, to freedom of information and
freedom of the press) entitle individuals to act on the basis of their
own personal knowledge and to acquire and take into account the
personal knowledge of others. They also protect spontaneous
information mechanisms, such as market prices, which enable
individuals to take into account knowledge dispersed among billions
of human beings even though individuals remain "rationally
ignorant" of most of this dispersed knowledge. Such decentralized
information and ordering of the actions of diverse persons with
117. See Rejoinder to Alston, supra note 3, at 845-51 (criticizing the
authoritarian premises of Alston's treatment of economic markets as a
"blackbox" where economic rights are not constitutionally protected, and
individuals are treated as mere objects of discretionary, welfare-reducing
governmental policies).
118. EC TREATY, supra note 45, art. 14.

119. Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 13.
120. See discussion supra text accompanying note 49 (referencing pertinent
jurisprudence of the E.C.J.).
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limited knowledge reduces the need for centralized government
regulation (such as laws imposing the majority's preferences on
minorities), which might unnecessarily limit individual freedom and
disrupt decentralized ordering, notwithstanding the inevitable need
for some centralized ordering, as in governmental and nongovernmental organizations, companies, and families. Freedom of
opinion and of commercial speech, for instance, are of constitutive
importance for the "marketing" of goods and services, and have
given rise to a vast jurisprudence of national and international courts
protecting and limiting the respective freedoms of producers (i.e., the
right to advertise their products) and consumers (i.e.,
the right to
2
'
products).'
dangerous
of
risks
consumer
the
criticize
2. Human rights as incentives for mutually beneficial
division of labor
Economic transactions are based on the exercise of liberty rights
(such as selling and buying) and the transfer of property rights (such
as trading goods). Human rights (e.g., property rights, freedom of
contract) set incentives for savings, investments, and mutuallybeneficial division of labor among self-interested actors (for
example, by requiring compensation in case of non-fulfillment of
contracts or of governmental takings of property rights). They
protect individual rights to acquire, buy, and sell goods and services
that are necessary for personal self-development, but whose supply
remains scarce in relation to consumer demand. Equal human rights
force people to take into account the interests of others (i.e., by
requiring consent to rights transfers) and to settle disputes peacefully
based on respect for the rule of law. The WTO rules on trade-related
intellectual property rights (TRIPS), for instance, are justified by the
holders of patent rights and of other intellectual property rights by
the "incentive functions" and "compensation functions" of such
temporary monopoly rights for making private investments and
recuperating the high investment costs of pharmaceutical products.
121. The interesting question of why human rights courts often protect
freedom of commercial speech more comprehensively than trade courts do
cannot be pursued here. See, e.g., Hertel v. Switzerland, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
2299, 2343 (concluding that restrictions on freedom of speech imposed under
the Swiss Unfair Competition Law, and upheld by Swiss courts, were in
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
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The WTO's Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health,12 2 and the follow-up WTO decision on implementation of
paragraph six of that Doha Declaration,123 "re-balanced" the
legitimate scope of certain patent rights through legal changes that
will make it easier for poor countries to import cheaper generic
medicines made under compulsory licensing if they are unable to
manufacture the medicines themselves.
3. Human rights as conflict-prevention mechanisms
Human rights can help transform the Hobbesian "war of
everybody against everybody else" into peaceful cooperation based
on equal legal rights and access to courts. In the economy no less
than in the polity, the inevitable conflicts of interests (e.g., between
producer interests in high sales prices and consumer interests in low
prices) can best be reconciled on the basis of equal liberty rights
(e.g., freedom of contract) and other human rights (e.g., to judicial
protection). Human rights also enable decentralized solutions for the
"value problem" that human views about "truth" may differ, and
value judgments about "the good" and "the beautiful" are not
necessarily true. 12 4 By protecting diversity of individual values (e.g.,
through freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, and freedom of the
press), and by preventing majorities from imposing their value
preferences on minorities, human rights promote peaceful
coexistence, tolerance, and scientific progress. For instance, in a
recent judgment, the EC Court of Justice held that even though
Austria's failure to ban a political demonstration blocking freedom
of transit on an important motorway amounted to a restriction of free
122. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
_e/minist_e/min0 1_e/mindecl_trips__e.pdf.
123. Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declarationon the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT[L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003), at
http://www.wto.org/
english/trtope/tripsLe/implem para6 e.htm.
124. On Immanuel Kant's distinction between truth (analyzed in Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason), value judgments (analyzed in Kant's Critique of
PracticalReason), and esthetic judgments (analyzed in Kant's Critique of the
Human Ability to Judge), and on decentralized methods (e.g., markets and
democracies) and centralized methods (e.g., dictatorships) to overcome
conflicts about value judgments, see WOLFGANG FICENTSCHER, FREIHEIT ALS
AUFGABE [FREEDOM AS A TASK] 50-51 (1997).
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movement of goods in the EC (a violation of Article 28 of the EC
Treaty), the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly, as protected by the Austrian Constitution and
the European Convention on Human Rights, could justify
the
25
EC.1
the
in
goods
of
movement
of
freedom
the
restriction of
Effective protection of human rights inevitably gives rise to
information markets, economic markets, political markets, and also
"legal markets" as decentralized means for evaluating scarce
resources (such as private and public goods and services) in a
manner respecting individual freedom and responsibility, promoting
dialogues about values, and allocating and distributing resources in
accordance with consumer demand.
4. Human rights as countervailing powers and decentralized
remedies against "market failures"
Human rights historically emerged through "bottom-up
struggles" in order to empower citizens to limit abuses of public and
private powers through "inalienable constitutional rules" of a higher
legal rank. Whereas first-generation civil and political human rights
aim at regulating "political markets" by protecting general citizen
interests (e.g., in individual and democratic self-governance and
judicial protection) against abuses of political power, secondgeneration "economic and social human rights" focus on regulating
"economic markets" and promoting "social welfare." The history of
"human rights revolutions" demonstrates that human rights (e.g., to
self-defense vis-A-vis illegal abuses of power) offer "checks and
balances" enabling citizens (such as women and minorities) to
defend their equal rights against abuses of powers and to limit the
constitutional task of governments to the "common public interest"
defined in terms of equal human rights. By defining core human
rights as "inalienable," and by requiring respect for the equal human
rights of all others, human rights require substantive and procedural
justifications of governmental restrictions and promote democratic
accountability. It is no coincidence that the general exceptions (e.g.,
125. Case C- 112/00, Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planziige
v. Republic Osterreich, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 34, 1043 (2003),
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/dat/2003/c_184/c__18420030802en000100002.
pdf.
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in GATT Article XX) and other "public interest clauses" in WTO
law as well as in regional integration agreements (such as Article 30
of the EC Treaty) permit governmental restrictions of freedom of
trade, subject to legal requirements of non-discrimination and
necessity that are similar to the non-discrimination, necessity, and
proportionality requirements in human rights law for governmental
restrictions of other individual freedoms.
By offering additional safeguards against market failures such as
"external effects," "asymmetries in information," and "social
injustice" (resulting, e.g., from selfish utility-maximization by
individual economic actors), human rights complement the
objectives of "social market economies." EC competition rules and
other EC common market rules offer many examples of
intergovernmental rules empowering individuals to seek judicial
protection against abuses of private economic power (such as cartel
agreements and monopolization) as well as of public power (such as
public monopolies and trade-distorting subsidies).
5. Human rights as decentralized dispute settlement
and enforcement mechanisms
The decentralized empowerment of investors, producers, traders,
consumers, and other individuals, through assignment of liberty
rights, property rights, and other individual rights (e.g., of access to
scarce resources, markets and courts), can transform short-term
conflicts of interest into mutually beneficial cooperation and promote
a decentralized "self-enforcing constitution." Human rights (such as
individual access to courts) and corresponding obligations (such as
compensation for violations of individual rights) set incentives for
decentralized enforcement of rules by self-interested, vigilant
citizens and for spontaneous, private initiatives to "internalize"
harmful "market externalities" (e.g., by invoking property rights and
126
human rights to a clean environment vis-A-vis harmful pollution).
The private enforcement and judicial protection of the EC Treaty's
126. See HuMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(Alan Boyle & Michael Anderson eds., 1998) (recognizing the importance of
human rights for rendering environmental law and environmental protection
more effective); ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(Francesco Francioni ed., 2001); MAGUELONNE DbJEANT-PONS & MARC
PALLEMAERTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002).
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guarantees of non-discrimination (e.g., "equal pay for male and
female workers for equal work" pursuant to Article 141 of the EC
Treaty), and of free movements of goods, services, persons, and
capital across frontiers as "fundamental individual rights" illustrates
that a rights-based approach can be successfully applied to economic
integration not only inside constitutional democracies but also across
frontiers. 127 Likewise, the EU citizen rights to a direct election of the
European Parliament and to direct access to the European Court of
Justice apply constitutional principles to the EU's "political market"
that are also recognized at the national level in all EU member states
(e.g., human rights to democratic participation in the exercise of
government powers, rights of individual access to courts). Human
rights require legislative, administrative, and judicial protection
specifying and balancing human rights, and thereby promote a living
"human rights culture" and continuous adjustment of law and
"justice" to changing situations. Access to justice and judicial
review are perceived positively (including at the international level,
such as in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO)
as indispensable elements of rights-based legal systems in order to
provide "security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system," "preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance28with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law.'
6. Human rights as sources of democratic legitimacy
The human rights to "periodic and genuine elections.., by
universal and equal suffrage"' 129 and to democratic participation in
the exercise of government powers 1 , promote transparent
governance based on "the will of the people'
and on "deliberative

127. See supra text accompanying note 49.
128. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization, Annex 2, art. III para. 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
129. UDHR, supra note 13, art. 21.
130. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 16,
art. 25.
13 1.UDHR,supra note 13, art. 21.
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democracy"' 32 legitimating the exercise of political power at national
and international levels. By defining principles of justice which
constitutionally limit and guide all government activities, human
rights inform and educate people on how they can realize individual
and democratic self-government and mutually beneficial cooperation
across frontiers while avoiding conflicts with the independent actions
of others. The U.N. Resolutions on the right to development, for
instance, rightly define development
in terms of fulfillment of basic
133
needs and of human rights.
D. Human Rights and the Economic Theory of Optimal
Interventions: Subsidiarity of Social Rights?
The economic theory of optimal intervention teaches that
governments should correct market failures through "optimal"
interventions directly at the source of the problem (such as by
competition rules prohibiting cartels and other abuses of economic
power) without reducing the social gains from non-discriminatory
competition and without preventing citizens from engaging in
mutually beneficial trade across frontiers. 134 The definition of
specific civil, political, economic, social, and cultural human rights
and constitutional rights, in national and international constitutions
as well as in human rights instruments, as individual remedies for
specific human rights problems can be seen as an application of the
basic insights of economic theories about separation and
decentralized regulation of policy instruments that take into account
locally different policy preferences and regulatory problems. In both
economic as well as in political markets, individual rights offer
decentralized "first best policy instruments" empowering citizens to
protect themselves through legal, judicial, and political remedies
against "government failures" as well as "market failures." The
identification of the "optimal level" and "optimal target" of
government interventions and of legal rules remains, however, often
controversial. Article 295 of the EC Treaty, for instance, leaves the
132. See, e.g., DELIBERATIvE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold
Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999).

133. See Declarationon the Right to Development, supra note 63.
134. See generally PETERSMANN, supra note 110, at 57-58 (surveying this
economic theory of optimal intervention, with references to economics
literature).
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regulation of property rights to the national legal system of each
member state where individual property rights may be better tailored
to the particular traditions and preferences of citizens. 135 The focus
of EC competition law and policies on protection of "economic
freedom" of competitors in the marketplace differs fundamentally
from the focus of some national competition laws (for example, in
the U.S.) on protection of competition as a process. 3 6 This divergent
focus illustrates how the legal design of competition rules and of
individual rights to "freedom of competition"'137 in national and
international competition laws may differ legitimately depending on
the underlying value premises.
The move from sovereign nation states to internationally
integrated "market states" has not prevented modem welfare states
from retaining primary responsibility for social and health security
on their respective territory.
Democratic preferences and
"opportunity costs" for social welfare policies ("distributive
justice"), and the role of trade unions, collective bargaining, and
unemployment continue to differ from country to country, even
inside the EC. National social and health services in EC member
states, however, are subject to single market principles such as
freedom to provide services, free movement of workers, and non135. EC TREATY, supranote 45, art. 295.
136. U.S. competition lawyers criticize this European notion of "restriction
on economic freedom" on several grounds such as: "(1) its failure to generate
precise operable legal rules (i.e. failure to provide an analytical framework);
(2) its distance from and tension with (micro)economics which does provide an
analytical framework; (3) its tendency to favour traders/competitors over
consumers and consumer welfare (efficiency) and (4) its capture... of totally
innocuous contract provisions having no anti-competitive effects in an
economic sense." Barry E. Hawk, System Failure:Vertical Restraints and EC
Competition Law, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 973, 978 (1995). For an
explanatory example of the EC position, see Philip Marsden, The Divide on
Verticals, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC
COOPERATION? 117 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000). For a different U.S.
position, see Eleanor M. Fox, "We Protect Competition, You Protect
Competitors", 26 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 149 (2003).
137. On "freedom of competition" in EC law, see Case 240/83, Procureur de
la R~publique v. Association de d6fense des braileurs d'huiles usag6es, 1985
E.C.R. 531; Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Awocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] CEC (CCH) 175, 193
(1995); Case 222/86, Union Nationale des Entraineurs et Cadres Techniques
Professionnales du Football v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097, [1989] 1 CEC
(CCH) 131 (1987).
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discriminatory treatment (e.g., of migrant workers). Whereas EC
Council Regulation 1408/71 limited the application of social security
schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the
EC, the individual rights to intra-European social security have been
progressively expanded from "market citizens" to "EU citizens" and
to third country nationals inside the EC. 138 The EC Court of Justice
has confirmed the applicability of EC competition rules to certain
social and labor policies, such as state monopolies for employment
placement services and pension funds set up in collective
agreements. 139 Yet, collective agreements among "social partners"
appear to be immune from EC competition law. 40 Thus far, not only
European labor law and its participatory institutions, but also the
broader EC social policies, fail to secure the labor market flexibility
necessary for achieving full employment without inflationary wage
policies and without abuses of social security systems.
The EC Court of Justice rightly emphasizes that economic
freedoms "are not absolute, but must be viewed in relation to their
social function."' 14 Yet, the social objectives of the EC Treaty (such
as the EC citizen rights to reside, live, and work in all EC member
states and the EC guarantees of freedom of association, collective
bargaining, the right to strike, and of other workers' rights and social
rights) should remain consistent with the economic EC Treaty
objectives of, for example, "non-inflationary growth,"' 142 "price
stability,"' 43 and "an open market economy with free competition,
favouring an efficient allocation of resources"' 44 in order to avoid
inflationary wage policies and reduce incentives for "moral hazard"
in labor markets and social policies. 45 So far, social rights and the
corresponding obligations of governments and "social partners" are
138. See MARK

BELL, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE EUROPEAN

(2002).
139. See id. at 11 (referencing the jurisprudence of the E.C.J.).
140. Cf Case C-67/96, Albany Int'l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751.
141. Case C-44/94, The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex
parte Nat'l Fed. of Fishermen's Org. and Others, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3115, 1-3152.
142. EC TREATY, supra note 45, art. 2.
143. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
144. Id. art. 105, para. 1.
145. Cf Simon Deakin, Labour Law as Market Regulation: The Economic
Foundations of European Social Policy, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LABOUR
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 63 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 1996).
UNION
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not yet adequately designed to achieve full employment in the EC.
"Regulatory competition" among diverse national labor and social
laws, within the limits of common core labor standards guaranteed
by EC law, may correspond better to the diversity of preferences,
resources, and "social opportunities" of citizens in EC member states
than premature EC harmonization of national labor and social laws.
Even though recognition of social rights at the EC level may help to
progressively build a broader European consensus on the right
balance between wealth creation and distributive justice, the
implementation of social rights at national levels may legitimately
differ.
Also beyond Europe, global market integration is increasingly
accompanied by global recognition of inalienable and indivisible
human rights (e.g., in U.N. law), social rights (e.g., in ILO law),
intellectual property rights (e.g., in the law of the World Property
Organization and the WTO's TRIPS Agreement), and investor rights
(e.g., in the almost 2000 bilateral investment treaties). Due to the
producer-driven politics of intergovernmental negotiations, investor
rights (such as on intellectual property) tend to be more effectively
protected and enforced than social rights that are of particular
importance for migrant workers and their families, for the poor,
vulnerable, and disadvantaged in society, and for the "losers" in
international competition.
The respective interpretation and
interrelationships (e.g., of non-discrimination requirements in human
rights law, trade law and economic law) raise numerous questions
that need further clarification.

IX. HUMAN RIGHTS

REQUIRE A "SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY":
DIVERSITY OF APPROACHES RECONCILING HUMAN RIGHTS
AND MARKET COMPETITION

Modem national constitutions (such as Article 1 of the German
Basic Law) and EU law proceed from the value premise that:
"[h]uman dignity is inviolable.
It must be respected and
'
1
46
protected.'
Human rights entail social responsibilities of
governments to enable each citizen to live a life of dignity, freedom,
and responsibility. In addition to constituting individual rights and
corresponding governmental obligations, human rights also require
146. EU CHARTER, supra note 2, art. 1.
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governments147 to promote "principles of justice," such as
"solidarity,"'
equal opportunities, and promotion of welfareincreasing competition without undermining human rights so that the
"losers" in the market game also retain effective access to the goods
and services necessary for the enjoyment of human rights. In
Europe, and increasingly also in the WTO's "Development Round"
of worldwide trade negotiations, international market integration has
proven politically unsustainable without complementary social rights
and solidarity obligations for a "social market economy," as now
explicitly called
for in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution
48
Europe.1
for
The approaches of regional and worldwide organizations (such
as the EU, NAFTA, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and ILO) to
the promotion and protection of human rights and market
competition continue to differ considerably. Four different, and in
part complementary, approaches can be distinguished.
A. Benevolent Government Approaches: Inadequaciesof the EU
Commission's White Paperon Governance in Europe
Benevolent government approaches are characterized by
government discretion to define the "public interest" in a manner
discriminating among domestic citizens (e.g., discretion to
redistribute income among domestic citizens through discriminatory
border restrictions and discriminatory regulation of the domestic
economy in favor of powerful producer interests).
Several
worldwide and regional organizations commit themselves to "good
governance principles" without clarifying their relationships to
human rights. 149 The recent Commission White Paper on "European
Governance 150 likewise recommends "good governance principles"
147. See id. ch. IV.
148. DRAFT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 3.
149.

Cf, e.g., WORLD BANK GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (George

Black & Patricia Armstrong eds., 1995); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FINAL REPORT OF THE AD Hoc WORKING
GROUP ON PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (1995),

available at http://www.oecd.org/publications/0,2743,en_2649_201185_1_1
1_1_1 ,00.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
150. COMMISSION
OF
THE EUROPEAN
CoMMUNITIES,
EUROPEAN
GOVERNANCE: A WHITE PAPER, COM(01)428 final at 3, available at

Fall 2003]

JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, & MARKETS

(such as "openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness...
coherence"' 151 ) and objective constitutional principles (such as the
"Community method") for "connect[ing] Europe with its citizens"
and protecting the "general interest" through legislative and policy
proposals by the European Commission, rule-making by the
European Council and by the European Parliament, and judicial
protection of rule of law by national and EC courts. 52 Yet, the
Commission proposals for administrative and constitutional reforms
are not clearly linked to EU citizen rights, general consumer welfare,
and "social justice." As long as so many EU policies are designed to
serve protectionist producer interests (e.g., of agricultural and textiles
industries) rather than general citizen interests, there are good
reasons for popular distrust in "benevolent government approaches"
that do not effectively limit discriminatory abuses of government
powers.
Contrary to the White Paper, "governance" in the EU should not
be defined in a formal manner as only "rules, processes and behavior
that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level,
particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability,
effectiveness and coherence."15 3 Nor should "civil society" be
reduced to its organized components.- 4 The EU Treaty and the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights rightly proceed from "normative
individualism" as constitutional premise of EU law. Individual selfgovernance ("human dignity"), public confidence, and democratic
participation in EU governance depend more on EU protection of
equal individual rights than on paternalistic "good governance"
principles that do not effectively constrain interest group politics in
the EU. Arguably, the greater the distance between citizens and
representative governance at the international level (such as the EU
Parliament and EU Council), the greater the need for complementing
"representative democracy" through direct citizen rights defining the
"public interest" in a justiciable manner by empowering citizens to

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/govemance/white paper/en.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21, 2003).
151. Id. at 8 n.1.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 14-15.
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defend their equal rights vis-a-vis majority politics. 55 Not only the
EC's internal market integration, but also its policy integration and
EC leadership for global integration should be more clearly based on
legal and judicial protection of fundamental rights and general
consumer welfare.
B. Ordo-LiberalMarket IntegrationApproaches:
An Insufficient Basisfor Social Policy
Economic policies often do not define whether they are aimed at
maximizing "consumer welfare" (such as by prohibiting restrictive
business practices), "producer welfare" (such as by allowing private
price fixing) or "total national welfare" (such as by promoting export
cartels enhancing domestic producers' surplus at the expense 5of6
foreign consumers). The "European School" of "ordo-liberalism"'
emphasizes the need for "an open market economy with free
competition' 5 7 based on a non-discriminatory "system ensuring that
competition in the internal market is not distorted,"'' 58 as the most
efficient way of promoting producer productivity, innovation, and
job creation to meet consumer demand for goods and services.
While all citizens are consumers, their respective producer interests
often conflict and must be reconciled through non-discriminatory
competition rules. In order to maximize general consumer welfare
(as measured by price, quality, quantity, and diversity of goods and
services), competition and economic policies must be legally
constrained to empower citizens to protect themselves against abuses
of power (such as private monopolization, cartel agreements, or
arbitrary redistribution of income through government policies).

155. On this "inverse relationship" between human rights and parliamentary
democracy at national and international levels, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
From State Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Citizens in the International
Relations Law of the EU?, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 145 (Neil Walker
ed., forthcoming Nov. 2003).
156. See, e.g., DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 334-91 (1998) (discussing the
influence of the "European school" of "ordo-liberalism" on EC competition
law); DORIS HILDEBRAND, THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THE EC
COMPETITION RULES 1-5 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the "European school" of
"ordo-liberalism"and a "social market economy").
157. EC TREATY, supra note 45, arts. 4, 98, 105.
158. Id. art. 3(g).
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The European ordo-liberal tradition recognizes that, in order to
realize a "social market economy," the market-driven distribution of
income must be supplemented by additional social rules and policies.
Yet, neither the EC Treaty of 1957 nor ordo-liberal theory offered a
coherent blueprint for the development of social policies. During the
early years, the EC left social policies largely to national discretion
and developed common social rules at the EC level mainly in order
to promote market integration (e.g., by extending free movement of
persons to family members) and to prevent unfair competition (e.g.,
by securing non-discriminatory minimum standards for social
security and employment regulation). For instance, the EC Treaty's
guarantee of "equal pay for male and female workers for equal
work" 159 originally was motivated by French concerns at avoiding
competitive distortions. 60 The ordo-liberal competition approach
was not applied to labor markets and offered no coherent concept for
national and EC social policies.
C. Human Rights Approaches: Recognition of Social Rights as
IntegralParts of "SocialMarket Economies "
While human rights are not mentioned in the law of many
worldwide economic organizations (such as the IMF, the World
Bank, or the WTO) and regional organizations (such as NAFTA),
they have proven to be indispensable for promoting democratic
legitimacy and social responsibility in European integration. Also,
social rights are explicitly protected in the EC Treaty. According to
Article 136:
The Community and the Member States, having in mind
fundamental social rights such as those set out in the
European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October
1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their
objectives the promotion of employment, improved living
and working conditions, so as to make possible their
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained,
proper social protection, dialogue between management and

159. Id. art. 141.
160. Cf BELL, supra note

138, at 8.
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labour, the development of human resources with a view to
lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion.
To this end the Community and the Member States shall
implement measures which take account of the diverse
forms of national practices, in particular in the field of
contractual relations, and the need to maintain the
competitiveness of the Community economy.161
In contrast to the earlier distinction of a "market correction
function" of national social policies and a "market-building function"
of EC social policies, 62 the newly introduced "open method of coordination" has led to an increasing integration of employment,
labor, social, economic, and human rights policies in the EU aimed at
promoting full employment and human dignity as overriding
paradigms. 63 Emphasis on corporate social responsibility and on
more precise obligations of social partners is another characteristic of
the recent evolution of social policies in the EU. 164
At the worldwide level, the ILO and various U.N. human rights
bodies likewise emphasize the need for taking into account the
human rights obligations of all U.N. member states in all policy
areas, including monetary policies in the IMF, development policies
in the World Bank Group, and trade policies in the WTO context.
Human rights demand legal obligations not only for national
governments, but also for the collective exercise of government
powers in regional and worldwide organizations. For instance, U.N.
human rights bodies rightly emphasize that human rights to food,
health, education, development, property, the enjoyment of the
benefits of scientific progress, and intellectual property may be
relevant for interpreting WTO rules on protection of intellectual
property rights and trade in goods and services (e.g., regarding

161. EC TREATY, supra note 45, art. 136.
162. Cf, e.g., Wolfgang Streeck, From Market Making to State Building?
Reflections on the PoliticalEconomy of European Social Policy, in EUROPEAN
SOCIAL POLICY: BETWEEN FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION 389 (Stephan

Liebfried & Paul Pierson eds., 1995).
163. See Erika Szyszczak, The New Paradigmfor Social Policy: A Virtuous
Circle?, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2001).
164. See generally L'ACTION COLLECTIVE EN EUROPE [COLLECTIVE ACTION
IN

EUROPE] (Richard Balme et al. eds., 2002).
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availability, accessibility, and acceptability
of educational and health
165
services, food, and medicines).
D. Social CitizenshipModels: The EU Charter
of FundamentalRights
The EC Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
protect additional rights and duties of the "citizens of the Union,"
such as "the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States."' 66 The EU Charter's chapter IV on "solidarity"
recognizes comprehensive social rights and corresponding
government responsibilities, thereby complementing the economic
market access rights with rights to participation in labor markets and
to social security. The comprehensive EC powers to "combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation" 167 have led to EC directives on
racial equality 168 and equal treatment in employment and
occupation, 169 which reflect a further move towards an antidiscrimination law that is based more on the protection of
fundamental rights than on an economic market integration rationale.
X. CONCLUSION: NEED FOR PROVIDING THE "GLOBAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT" WITH A MORE COHERENT THEORY OF JUSTICE

The two "European Conventions" which successfully elaborated
the EU Charter as well as the Draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe,' 70 and the increasing "global justice
campaigns" by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which
influence international rule-making ever more actively (e.g., on the
International Criminal Court, environmental agreements, WTO
negotiations), illustrate the emergence of a new international "civil
society." Additionally, these conventions and campaigns establish
the emergence of new, more democratic forms of international rulemaking and international public discussions ("deliberative
democracy") that focus not only on intergovernmental
165. See supra Part VI and notes 85-88.
166. EC TREATY, supra note 45, art. 18.
167. Id. art. 13.
168. Council Directive 2000/43, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22.
169. Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.
170. See sources cited supra note 2.
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representatives and negotiations, but also on more active
participation by members of parliaments and other representatives of
"civil society." The central aim of the WTO "Development Round"
to help less-developed countries benefit more from the global
division of labor, and the increasing calls for adapting the statecentered U.N. system to the needs of the twenty-first century (by, for
example, enforcing the human rights obligations of U.N. law more
effectively vis-i-vis the many "failed" and non-democratic U.N.
member states) are further illustrations of the increasing recognition
that global market integration must be supplemented by a new U.N.
security system focusing on "human security" and democratic "peace
by satisfaction,"' 71 as well as by a more comprehensive global
integration geared toward eradicating unnecessary poverty and
securing "social justice."
European integration is characterized by multi-level national and
international guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law,
democratic peace, and other civil, political, economic, and social
human rights, as well as by additional constitutional rules that can be
invoked and enforced by citizens in national and international courts.
Moreover, at the worldwide level, WTO rules and human rights
entail
complementary
obligations
of governments
and
intergovernmental organizations to respect and to promote freedom,
non-discriminatory competition, and individual self-development in
dignity across frontiers. In addition to liberty rights, property rights,
and other human rights promoting the efficient use of scarce
resources through decentralized market mechanisms, social human
rights have proven essential for dealing with the social adjustment
problems (e.g., unemployment) of market competition in a manner
respecting and promoting individual self-development and
responsibility in dignity.
The instrumental economic and social functions of human rights
for creating and distributing the scarce resources needed for enjoying
human rights are of particular importance vis-A-vis less-developed
WTO member countries and the Eastern European "transition
countries" that have decided to open and adjust their formerly
protected economies so as to benefit more from international division
171. See RAWLS,supra note 20, at 47 (distinguishing between "peace by
satisfaction" and "peace by power").
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Human rights and market integration law pursue
of labor.
complementary objectives (such as freedom and equal opportunities
of individuals) on the basis of complementary principles (such as
necessity and proportionality of governmental restrictions of
individual freedom) that must be construed in a mutually consistent
manner. The international government obligations to protect human
rights and non-discriminatory competition across frontiers
complement and extend the corresponding obligations in domestic
legal systems, thereby reinforcing national "bottom-up struggles" by
international "top-down pressures" to abolish welfare-reducing
market access restrictions and to protect human rights more
effectively.
The "constitutional functions" of international
guarantees of freedom, non-discriminatory competition, and social
security are particularly visible with regard to international
movements of persons where, for example, the market freedoms and
non-discrimination requirements of EC law have been supplemented
by transnational citizen rights and social security rights for migrant
persons.
The dynamic evolution of regional and global integration law
illustrates that "justice" remains a never-ending regulatory task and
"cannot be related to any one value, be it equality or any other, but
only to the complex value system of a man, a community, or
mankind."' 172 The universal recognition of human rights requires a
citizen-oriented "constitutionalization" of the traditionally statecentered international legal system. European integration law and
international human rights law already extend far beyond the
"cosmopolitan rights" postulated by Immanuel Kant.'7 3 Yet, it
seems obvious that the current international economic and legal
order is not sufficiently "just" to be durable. The great achievement
of post-war national and international constitutionalism has been to
172. FRIEDRICH, supra note 11, at 199.
173. Cf IMMANUEL KANT, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

430, 446 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949) ("The Cosmopolitan or World Law shall
be limited to conditions of universal hospitality."); IMMANUEL KANT, Ideafor
a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT
116 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949). Kant did not envisage cosmopolitan
citizenship as a basis for universal, legally, and judicially-enforceable human
rights and constitutional law-making, but was preoccupied with a cosmopolitan
right to "hospitality," i.e., the ability of people to travel anywhere and be
treated in a civilized manner.

458

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:407

channel the all too often violent "struggles for law" into peaceful,
incremental changes and reforms of the post-war international legal
system.
International guarantees (e.g., in WTO law) for transnational
movement of goods, services, and capital extend far beyond
autonomous domestic laws and serve "constitutional functions" by
protecting citizens against welfare-reducing restrictions and
discrimination by their own governments. 174 The ever-increasing
number of national constitutional democracies and the emerging
international constitutional law in worldwide and regional
organizations offer a framework for progressively integrating the
different conceptions of social justice, human rights, democratic rulemaking, and economic order. The universal recognition of human
rights requires basing "international justice"--contrary to the views
of John Rawls-not only on freedom and equality of peoples,17 5 but
176 and multi-level constitutionalism.1 77
also on equal human rights
174. See generally PETERSMANN, supra note 110.
175. In his book, The Law of Peoples, Rawls rejects the constitutional values
of maximum equal freedoms of individuals, which he uses for his theory of
justice in a constitutional democracy as a basis for a theory of "international
justice" on the ground that these Western human rights values show
insufficient tolerance and respect for non-liberal, but "decent peoples."
RAWLS, supra note 20; RAWLS, supra note 1. Instead, the parties rationally
choosing the "principles of international justice" behind a "veil of uncertainty"
in the "original international position" (i.e., fictional deliberations and
negotiations on concluding an international constitutional contract) are
conceived as representatives of liberal or "decent" people (i.e., excluding
peoples that are not "well-ordered") who would rationally agree on a "law of
peoples" based on eight principles that are, in essence, already part of modern
international law. This distinction between liberal, decent, and non-liberal
peoples does not appear in Rawls's A Theory of Justice for constitutional
democracies, which argues on exclusively individualist grounds. See RAWLS,
supra note 1. The universally recognized "popular sovereignty" and selfdetermination of peoples and the mainly domestic causes of injustice, poverty,
and international inequalities entail that, according to Rawls, people are
responsible for their own development and have only limited duties to assist
other people living under unfavorable conditions.
176. See, e.g., THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989); FERNANDO
R. TES6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-126 (1998).
177. On the "constitutional functions" of international guarantees of
freedom, non-discrimination, and "justice," and of rule-making and
adjudication in international organizations, see Petersmann, supra note 71;
Petersmann, supra note 108. See also PETERSMANN, supra note 110.
Specifically on "multilevel constitutionalism" in EU law, see generally Ingolf

Fall 2003]

JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, & MARKETS

459

Both international justice and national justice depend on respect for
human rights empowering and protecting citizens, not only inside
constitutional democracies, but also in countries with non-democratic
governments. As explained already by Kant, human rights can be
effective only in a framework of national and international
constitutionalism. Today, human rights require democratic forms of
governance at national and international levels. 178 Given the
ubiquity of "market imperfections" (e.g., cartels, involuntary
unemployment) and the uneven distribution of resources (including
individual capabilities), "social justice" also requires social rights
guaranteeing effective access to the resources necessary for
individual self-development in dignity. The constitutional and
legislative definition, and the administrative and judicial protection,
of economic and social rights may, however, differ legitimately from
country to country and from international organization to
organization.

Pemice, Multilevel Constitutionalismand the Treaty ofAmsterdam: European
Constitution-MakingRevisited?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 703 (1999); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, The ForeignPolicy Constitutionof the European Union: A
Kantian Perspective, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER 433
(Ulrich Immenga et al. eds., 1996).
178. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see generally SUSAN
MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS (2002).
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